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Abstract 
 
To survive and grow, young firms must leverage different means, such as strategic 
alliances or founders’ personal networks, to access and acquire necessary external 
resources to overcome, or at least mitigate, the liability of newness. In this study, we 
found that the board of directors can serve as a means of resource provision for new 
ventures. We conducted a historical analysis and case studies on high-tech new 
ventures, in order to delve deeply into the processes regarding how boards are formed, 
how board members provide these resources, and what factors influence the processes. 
Results showed that a board of directors is more likely to be formed when the funds are 
raised from institutional investors, rather of individual investors. Moreover, for 
founders, formation of the board connotes an exchange of partial ownership for critical 
external resources. When more resources are needed, founders adjust their boards. 
Adjustments of the board can be categorized into two: “planned board adjustments” are 
initiated by the founders to acquire external resources, while “required board 
adjustments” are set out by disgruntled board members, and reduced resource 
endowments of the firm. In addition, board members exploit their individual assets, 
experience, reputation, and personal networks to provide personally endowed resources 
to the new venture, and leverage their firms’ assets, reputation, and business networks 
to contribute organizationally endowed resources. Board members also facilitate new 
ventures’ internationalization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study explores the process of 
board formation and adjustments in new 
ventures, and the influence of a board of 
directors in internationalization. This 
process has not been a focus of corporate 
governance research, or thoroughly 
investigated in new venture survival and 
growth studies. However, numerous 
entrepreneurs rely on the resources 
provided by board members to survive 
and to grow. It is essential to understand 
how resources are provided as the board 
of directors is formed and adjusted. 
Specifically, board members can provide 
certain resources or connections to 
facilitate internationalization of the new 
venture. Therefore, the authors undertook 
this study to better understand the above 
questions. 
For new ventures, resources are 
especially important, as they usually 
suffer from a lack of necessary resources; 
they are endowed only with the resources 
accumulated by their founders before 
establishment of the firm (Chandler & 
Hanks, 1994; Katz & Gartner, 1988). New 
ventures also have lower degrees of 
legitimacy and reputation, due to the lack 
of a track record demonstrating their 
credibility and reliability. Thus, new 
ventures tend to experience higher 
mortality rates than established firms. 
They commonly suffer from liabilities of 
both newness and smallness (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Levinthal, 1991; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). Even if a new 
venture is internally endowed with 
sufficient resources for its initial survival, 
the changing resource needs during its 
early growth stage inevitably lead to the 
originally endowed resources becoming 
obsolete. To survive and further grow, 
new ventures must solicit external 
resources that cannot be produced 
internally. Various methods such as 
alliances (e.g. Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Pisano, 1990) and the founders’ personal 
network relationships (e.g. Gulati, 1998; 
Jarillo, 1989; Larson & Starr, 1993) help 
new ventures to access and acquire the 
necessary resources externally, greatly 
mitigating the liabilities of newness and 
smallness.  
Boards of directors can serve as a 
means of resource provisions for new 
ventures. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
noted that “when an organization appoints 
an individual to a board, it expects the 
individual will come to support the 
organization, will concern himself with its 
problems, will variably present it to others, 
and will try to aid it” (1978: 163). 
Generally, an externally accountable 
board is formed, and a formalized 
governance structure is established in the 
time horizon immediately subsequent to a 
financing event (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Whisler, 1988). When a new venture is 
founded, and as it grows, the 
founder/CEO must make decisions to 
seek equity financing at critical junctures, 
either from informal financing sources 
such as angel investors or via formal ones 
such as venture capitalists or corporate 
investors. While this decision provides 
the funding necessary to continue the 
firm’s further development, consequent 
formation of the board also introduces 
certain critical external resources for the 
firm’s survival and growth. The formation 
of a board of directors is more than a 
separation of ownership and 
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management.1  
A board of directors is a group of 
individuals representing different 
stakeholders, each promoting their 
specific interests through the governance 
of the company. Board members in most 
legal jurisdictions have specific fiduciary 
duties, whereby they act for the benefit of 
relevant stakeholders (Berle & Means, 
1932). Hence, most corporate governance 
research examines how directors monitor 
and control managers’ behavior to ensure 
that they are acting in accordance with the 
interests of shareholders (e.g. Daily & 
Dalton, 1993; Daily et al., 2002), with the 
vast majority focusing on large-scale, 
established organizations (e.g., Fortune 
500 firms), and only a few working with 
newer and smaller firms (e.g. Huse, 2000; 
Dalton et al., 1998). Although there is a 
growing body of literature devoted to 
board members’ resource provision roles 
in the entrepreneurial context, more 
research in this aspect is still strongly 
called for (e.g. Daily et al., 2002; Huse, 
2000). Therefore, we conducted 
exploratory case studies to examine the 
processes of board formation and board 
adjustments in new ventures, as well as 
the influence of the board on firm 
internationalization.  
This study contributes to prior 
theories and practices in several aspects. 
First, it adds to the growing yet marginal 
literature of resource dependence roles of 
board members in entrepreneurial settings. 
Especially, the process of board formation 
has seldom, to our knowledge, been 
thoroughly investigated in past studies. 
                                                     
1 Many private firms have “advisory boards”, 
which mainly provide advices but do not bare 
fiduciary duties. (Huse, 2000; Whisler, 1988). 
As Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003) 
suggested, “it is…important to 
understand board formation as it relates to 
firm adolescence in order to gain fuller 
insights into the relationship between 
boards and firm performance in mature, 
older organizations (2003: 416).” Second, 
this study contributes to new venture 
survival and growth research. Existing 
literature in new venture survival and 
growth has highlighted several ways for 
new ventures to access and acquire 
critical resources externally, to survive, 
grow and further prosper, including 
alliances with other firms and exploitation 
of founders’ personal network 
relationships. In this study, it was shown 
that the formation and later adjustments of 
the board are an alternate means for new 
ventures to access and acquire critical 
strategic resources. At the same time, this 
approach has its price, and risks. Third, 
our study also provides entrepreneurs 
with practical references on how to form 
a formal board of directors, in order to 
solicit external resources, the kinds of 
resources that can be obtained from the 
board, and how board members provide 
them.  
In Section 2, the present literature on 
resource acquisitions by new ventures, 
functions of a boards of directors, and the 
internationalization of new ventures, is 
reviewed. Section 3, focuses on the 
research methodology. Case descriptions 
are presented in Section 4, followed by 
analysis of the data obtained from the 
cases and a detailed discussion of the 
research findings in Section 5. Section 6 
Given our interest in the formal board of 
directors, we did not include advisory boards to 
our study.  
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concludes the paper, giving implications, 
limitations, and future research 
suggestions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Resource Acquisitions by New 
Ventures 
 
In the field of entrepreneurship 
research, the survival and growth of new 
ventures has been a very important topic. 
Researchers from other disciplines such 
as strategy and organizations also noted 
the high mortality rates among young 
firms, relative to their older counterparts. 
Stinchcombe (1965) first introduced the 
concept of liability of newness to explain 
why more new ventures failed in 
comparison to established firms. He 
argued that new ventures usually lack 
considerable bases of influence and 
endorsement, stable exchange relation-
ships with important external constituents, 
and perceptions of quality, reliability and 
legitimacy that mature firms are already 
equipped with, from their years of 
experience. Numerous studies supported 
Stinchcombe’s conjecture of a liability of 
newness (e.g., Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Levinthal, 1991). Some 
other research challenged this 
interpretation, arguing that new ventures 
usually start small; the liability of 
newness, is actually a liability of 
smallness (for a review see Baum, 1996). 
Although researchers attribute high 
the mortality rate of new ventures 
differently, they commonly agree that 
new ventures are lacking in certain critical 
resources. A firm’s resources can be 
defined as “those (tangible and intangible) 
assets which are tied semi-permanently to 
the firm (Caves, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984)”. 
The resource-based perspective 
recognizes the potential impact of a 
startup’s resource configuration on the 
firm’s ability to survive and grow. For 
example, Penrose (1959) maintained that, 
in new firms, the absence of given 
resources could limit the firm’s growth, 
while the abundance of given resources 
could promote growth in such firms. 
Resources accumulated from the past 
experience of the founders can help a new 
venture in its initial establishment 
(Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Chandler & 
Jansen 1992), but these internal resources 
are not sufficient for it to survive and 
grow in the environment in which it was 
born. Resources contributed by the 
founders may not be adequate for the new 
venture. In addition, institutional theory 
argues that newly emergent organizations 
have lower degrees of legitimacy and 
reputation. Societal acceptance of the 
organizations and their consequent 
survival depends on their attainment of 
support from relevant entities in their 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; 
Katz & Gartner, 1988; Ruef & Scott, 1998; 
Scott, 1987). Thus, emerging firms need 
to gain access to external resources and 
know-how that cannot be produced 
internally. This point of view coincides 
with the resource dependence perspective, 
on the critical role of gaining resources 
from the environment (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 
1976; Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). The resource dependence of new 
ventures, on external resources is even 
more salient than that of their established 
counterparts, due to the scarcity of 
resources in the founding stage.  
As new ventures move from 
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emergence to early growth, their resource 
needs change, and they face new resource 
acquisition challenges. These resource 
acquisition challenges vary across the 
strategic contexts of emergence and early 
growth, creating an important catalyst for 
new ventures to solicit various paths to 
acquiring resources externally. Alliances 
have been found to provide access to 
complementary assets (Pisano, 1990) as 
well as access to external legitimacy and 
status, similar to that provided by 
legitimating institutions (Baum & Oliver, 
1991; Miner et al., 1990; Stuart et al., 
1999). Scholars have also identified that 
founders’ personal networks are critical 
avenues for the accessing and acquisition 
of resources for new venture survival and 
growth (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 1989; 
Larson & Starr, 1993).  
A board of directors, in addition to 
alliances and the founders own personal 
networks, can provide desirable resources 
for new ventures. Prior to a new venture’s 
founding, and during its early growth 
stage, the founders must make decisions 
in seeking equity financing at critical 
junctures, either through informal 
financing sources such as angels, or via 
formal ones such as venture capitalists or 
corporate investors. In general, externally 
accountable boards are formed in the time 
horizon immediately after a funding event 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Whisler, 1988). 
While the fund-raising activities provide 
the financing necessary to continue the 
firm’s further development, formation of 
the board further introduces certain 
critical external resources for the firm’s 
survival and growth. However, the 
resource provision function of the board 
does not seem to attract as much attention 
as the monitoring function.  
Roles of Boards of Directors: Agency 
Theory vs. The Resource Provision 
Perspective 
 
Current studies on the roles and 
functions of boards of directors usually 
follow two distinctive paths. The 
dominant path builds on agency theory, 
arguing that a crucial role for boards is to 
monitor or control management on behalf 
of shareholders; effective monitoring or 
controlling can improve firm performance 
by reducing agency costs. This stream of 
research has examined the relationship 
between the board and firm performance, 
either by focusing on board composition, 
or by focusing on board incentives, such 
as board independence or equity 
compensation. The second, relatively less 
explored, path of research is based on the 
resource dependence perspective (e.g. 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which focuses 
on the capability of boards of directors to 
provide resources otherwise unavailable 
to the firm. Scholars scrutinized the 
relationship between the board as a 
provider of resources (e.g., legitimacy, 
advice and counsel, and links to other 
organizations, etc.) and firm performance 
(see Johnson et al., 1996, Dalton et al., 
1998 for a review).  
 
Agency Theory and The Monitoring 
Role 
 
The majority of researchers from 
several different disciplines, including 
law, finance, sociology, and strategic 
management, have placed their focus on 
the monitoring role, also described as the 
“control” role (e.g. Johnson et al., 1996; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989), of the board of 
directors. The monitoring role refers to 
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the responsibility of directors to monitor 
managers on behalf of shareholders. The 
theoretical foundation of the board’s 
monitoring function originated from 
agency theory, which illustrates the 
potential for conflicts of interest arising 
from the separation of ownership and 
control in firms (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theorists 
see the key function of boards as, 
monitoring the actions or controlling the 
behavior of “agents”—managers—to 
protect the interests of “principals”—
owners or shareholders, in modern 
corporations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
Correspondingly, legal and finance 
scholars emphasize the fiduciary 
responsibilities of directors to ensure that 
managers are acting in accordance with 
the interests of shareholders (e.g. 
Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Berle & Means, 
1932). For years, the main concern has 
been “how owners, shareholders, and 
managers minimize the loss of value that 
results from the separation of ownership 
and control” (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
Numerous studies have addressed the 
influence of board composition, owner-
ship concentration, or board incentives to 
monitor firm performance. However, 
empirical findings have been inconclusive. 
Two recent meta-analyses of existing 
studies further found no statistical support 
for a relationship with board incentives 
when monitoring and firm performance 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003).  
 
Resource Dependence Theory and The 
Resource Provision Role 
 
The provision of resources also 
serves as an important role of the boards 
of directors. This role refers to the ability 
of a board to bring the resources necessary 
to a firm, with resources being “those 
(tangible and intangible) assets which are 
tied semi-permanently to a firm” (Caves, 
1980; Wernerfelt, 1984). The theoretical 
foundation of this role is built on Pfeffer 
and Salancik’s (1978) work on resource 
dependency. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 
2) argued that “the key to organizational 
survival is the ability to acquire and 
maintain resources”, and, “when an 
organization appoints an individual to a 
board, it expects the individual will come 
to support the organization, will concern 
himself with its problems, will variably 
present it to others, and will try to aid it” 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 163).  
Two reviews on boards of directors 
discuss the board’s roles regarding their 
resource provision function. Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) suggested two roles for 
directors beyond the monitoring or 
control role: strategy and service.  They 
depicted the “service” role as “enhancing 
company reputation, establishing contacts 
with the external environment, and giving 
advice and counsel to executives” (1989: 
292), and the “strategy” role as directors’ 
participation “in the strategic arena 
through advice and counsel to the CEO, 
by initiating their own analyses, or by 
suggesting alternatives” (1989: 298).  In a 
more recent review, Johnson et al. (1996) 
adopted a somewhat different categoriza-
tion, consisting of control, service, and 
resource dependence roles. They defined 
the “service” role as “directors advising 
the CEO and top managers on 
administrative and other managerial 
issues, as well as more actively initiating 
and formulating strategy” (1996: 411) and 
the “resource dependence” role as “the 
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board as a means for facilitating the 
acquisition of resources critical to the 
firm’s success” and “may also serve a 
legitimizing function” (1996: 411).  
 
The Need to Study Boards’ Resource 
Provision Roles in New Ventures 
 
Despite the differences in taxonomy, 
both the strategy and service roles from 
Zahra and Pearce (1989), and the service 
and resource dependence roles from 
Johnson et al. (1996) emphasize the 
board’s role in provision of resources, as 
opposed to the monitoring and controlling 
activities. The resource provision role is 
at least equally, if not more important, 
than the monitoring function.  
Most of the literature on boards of 
directors is based on large and well-
established firms and the boards of small 
and new firms have only recently received 
the attention of researchers (Daily, 2002; 
Huse, 1998). However, small firms are 
not just smaller versions of larger firms; 
they differ significantly from large firms 
in terms of their managerial style and 
corporate culture, independence, 
ownership, and the scale and scope of 
operations (e.g. Storey, 1987 & 1994), 
and also in their structure and decision-
making process (e.g. Smith et al, 1988). 
Applications of the findings in large firms 
to their smaller counterparts may suffer 
from faulty generalizations. The same 
concern also holds for mature firms, 
because the boards in well-established 
firms may “reflect anachronistic attributes 
unadjusted for the firms’ present 
situations and needs (Lynall et al., 2003: 
416).” It is therefore essential to pursue 
the study of boards of directors in 
entrepreneurial settings.  
As discussed earlier, resource 
dependencies are especially significant in 
the context of new ventures. Resources 
provided by boards can be particularly 
valuable for the survival and growth of 
new ventures. Daily et al. (2002) 
articulated that “in entrepreneurial firms, 
the resource dependence role may be even 
more critical than for large, mature firms. 
The crucial issues may not be that firm’s 
boards, or their investors, are able to 
control the policies, procedures, or 
practices of CEOs and their TMT 
members. Instead, it may be the ability of 
board members, venture capitalists, or 
high-ranking managers to provide the 
firm with access to information, and 
resources that would otherwise be 
unavailable to it.”  These arguments are in 
line with the resource dependence 
perspective, and reinforce the necessity of 
studies on boards in entrepreneurial 
settings. 
 
The Internationalization in New 
Ventures 
 
Internationalization is an important 
growth strategy for new ventures 
(Fernhaber & Li, 2013; George, Wiklund, 
& Zahra, (2005); Prashantham & Floyd, 
2019).  A prominent study by Oviatt and 
McDougall (2005) proposed a framework 
for international new ventures, suggesting 
alternative governance structures, which 
rely on external networks sharing 
complementary assets with the firm.  
These findings imply that when new 
ventures have insufficient resources to 
pursue internationalization, they will 
adopt alternative governance structures, 
e.g. finding (new) external partners who 
can provide access to important resources.  
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Despite the pivotal focus on the changes 
in governance structures in new ventures 
after internationalization, other recent 
studies have investigated factors that 
influence the internationalization and the 
performance of new ventures in different 
contexts (Evers, 2010; Klijn, Reuer, 
Volberda, & van den Bosch, 2019; 
Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015).  
However, there still exists a limited 
volume of relevant literature that offers an 
overview of the formation and adjustment 
processes of the board, especially 
regarding a firm’s internationalization.   
Among the studies with key 
emphasis on the role of the board of 
directors in new ventures, Barroso, 
Villegas, and Peréz-Carelo (2011) 
attempted to identify sources of board 
competence and revealed a negative 
relationship between average board 
tenure and a firm’s degree of international 
diversification.  In a different study, Chen, 
Chang, and Hsu, (2017) focused on the 
effects of board capital on firm’s 
internationalization and included board 
co-working as a positive moderator in the 
board capital-internationalization 
relationship. More recently, 
Hooghiemstra, Hermes, Oxelheim, and 
Randøy (2019) investigated the 
monitoring role of the board of directors 
to explain the reasons why board 
internationalization could increase or 
decrease earning management practices. 
Noticeably, these authors did not 
sufficiently provide insights into the 
pattern and the degree of involvement of 
the board of directors in the 
internationalization.   
Given the inadequacy of the current 
literature on the board’s resource 
provision roles in new ventures and their 
involvement in the internationalization of 
the new ventures, our study seeks to offer 
preliminary insights into the process of 
board formation, adjustment, as well as 
the level of board involvement in the 
internationalization of the new ventures.   
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study adopted an exploratory 
case study approach for several reasons. 
First, exploratory fieldwork is essential in 
emerging areas of research that lack an 
existing body of theories and data (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967; Noda & Bower, 1996). 
Second, qualitative studies are necessary 
where organizational processes, such as 
the processes of board formation and 
board adjustments, are involved. 
Quantitative measurements are either 
inappropriate or not preferable in this 
situation. (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Van 
Maanen, 1979; Yin, 1983). Third, 
detailed exploration of the processes of 
how the board of directors is formed, and 
how the board members contribute 
necessary resources for the survival and 
growth of a new venture, requires a level 
of analysis not available through survey-
based research (Yin, 1983). In addition, 
according to Paul and Rosado-Serrano 
(2018), who reviewed research on the 
internationalization of new ventures 
during 1995-2018, summarizing the 
research methods used in those studies, it 
was found that the majority of research in 
this field adopted a case study approach 
(38%), followed by quantitative 
approaches using regression analysis 
(23%), surveys (22%), mixed methods 
(14%), and cluster analysis (3%).  So, the 
adoption of a case study approach is 
common in this field.  Finally, the use of 
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exploratory case research enables ideas to 
be developed for further study (Noda & 
Bower, 1996).  
Five companies were selected for use 
as case studies (see Table 1). The firms 
were chosen through purposeful sampling 
(Patton, 1990), which is a criterion-based 
selection method that permits a sample to 
be constructed fitting a predefined profile. 
Two reasons led to the selection of 
companies in the computer and 
electronics industry only. First, 
Taiwanese firms play an important role in 
the global economic landscape—more 
than 90% of the laptops produced 
worldwide are manufactured by 
Taiwanese contract manufacturers (Lin, 
2015). Second, firms from the computer 
and electronics industry exhibit a higher 
degree of internationalization than firms 
from other industries—13 of the top 20 
companies with the highest level of 
internationalization are computer and 
electronics firms (Kuo & Kao, 2011). To 
understand board formation and board 
adjustments in new ventures, and their 
influences in internationalization, 
selecting cases from the computer and 
electronics industry will generate more 
insights. Only new ventures with 
Taiwanese founders were selected, but 
selection was not limited to only founding 
locations within Taiwan, in order to 
increase the richness of information. To 
be eligible for selection, each company 
had to match the definition of a new 
venture [defined as companies that are 
less than eight years old by McDougall, 
Covin, Robinson & Herron (1994)] and 
small in size [fewer than 500 employees, 
the definition of small and medium-sized 
firm (an SME) provided by the American 
Small Business Administration (c.f. 
Hodgetts & Kuratko, 1998)], and must 
have a formal board of directors baring 
fiduciary duties. Existing literature 
showed that externally accountable 
boards are usually formed in the time 
horizon immediately after a financing 
event (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Whisler, 
1988).  
To ensure correct understanding of 
the board formation and adjustment 
processes, examination of the board 
formation process was broadened to 
include relevant funding activities.  The 
data required for the study were collected 
from in-depth interviews with founders, 
CEOs, CTOs or managers (90 minutes for 
each interview on average) and publicly 
available archival sources, including 
company websites and documents (such 
as financial reports, annual reports, 
corporate press releases, public 
conferences, and magazine or newspaper 
reports).  Follow-up questions were 
conducted via email communication 
iteratively.  The data obtained from 
interviews, email, and archival sources 
were triangulated, revealing a high level 
of consistency (Denzin, 1978; Janesick, 
1994). Interviewees (key informants) 
were selected based on their experience of 
founding their firms and forming the 
board of directors. Only individuals who 
had complete experience of board 
formation and board adjustment were 
eligible to be the key informants. Table 2 
summarizes the profiles of the key 
informants. 
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Table 1. A summary of the companies examined 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E 
Industry Hardware Software Software Internet/service Software 
Main products/ 
services Blade servers 
Cellular phone 
mobility 
management 
software 
Melody 
recognition 
software and 
firmware 
Chinese female 
community 
website 
Real-time 
multi-lingual 
transformation 
software 
Country founded US US Taiwan Taiwan US 
 
Table 2: Key informants’ profiles 
Company Key 
Informant 
Position Industry 
experience 
Gender 
Company A Mr. Q Co-founder & 
CEO 
22 years Male 
Company B Mr. C Co-founder & 
CTO 
10 years Male 
Company C Ms. S Co-founder & 
COO 
15 years Female 
Company D Mr. H Co-founder & 
CEO 
12 years Male 
Company E Mr. L Co-founder & 
CTO 
25 years Male 
 
 
Adopting a case study approach 
allows the use of replication logic and 
helps to obtain validity (Rialp, Rialp, 
Urbano, & Vaillant, 2005).  To ensure the 
validity of our findings, a research 
assistant was needed.  Besides the 
interviewer and the participant, a research 
assistant was present to take note of the 
conversation during the interview.  
Interview scripts were then transcribed 
and prepared individually by the 
interviewer and the research assistant.  
After checking and combining the two 
scripts, the full write-ups were completed.  
The transcription process was not carried 
out in isolation, but also engaged note-
taking of key findings to form an initial 
analysis which was to be followed by a 
more in-depth examination.  To verify the 
overall accuracy of the transcripts and the 
summary of key findings, a process of 
cross-checking with the interview 
participants was employed.  It allowed the 
participants to provide clarification and 
add further comments.  These processes 
were used to triangulate the validity of the 
findings and to enhance the quality of the 
research design.   
To address the global endeavor issue 
in qualitative research (Flick, 2014; Flick 
& Röhnsch, 2014), this study also noted 
the local and cultural challenges in 
conducting qualitative research.  As 
suggested by Flick and Röhnsch (2014), 
we employed a systematic triangulation 
of perspectives, i.e. investigator triangu-
lation (by using a research assistant with 
a Western background and English skills 
to be involved with the data collection) 
and methodological triangulation (by 
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using different data collection methods, 
e.g. interviews, observation, and 
collection of publicly available data from 
various archival sources). 
The next section provides the 
analysis of our five cases.  
 
4. CASE ANALYSIS AND 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
 
Case studies were analyzed by 
looking at the entire process of raising 
initial funds, forming the board of 
directors, and adjusting the board of 
directors after additional funding 
activities. Data showed that the boards of 
directors in each of the case studies did 
provide critical resources for the new 
ventures. Meanwhile, the study showed 
that there were distinctions in the 
processes of board formation and board 
adjustments, between the five cases. 
Diversity in the boards’ provision of 
resources was also revealed. A summary 
of board formation, board adjustments, 
and resource provision, is provided in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3. A summary of board formation and adjustment processes and resource 
provisions. 
 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E 
 
Initial 
funding 
source 
 
VC Family & friends 
 
Family &friends; 
corporate 
investors 
 
Corporate 
investors 
Founders 
Resources 
acquired in 
initial fund 
raising 
Financial 
capital;  
business 
functions; 
consultation; 
business 
opportunities; 
legitimacy 
Financial capital; 
consultation; 
business 
opportunities; 
Financial capital; 
business function;  
office space 
Financial 
capital 
Founders’ 
endowments 
Second 
funding 
source 
 
Corporate 
investors 
 
VCs; corporate 
investors 
 
Corporate 
investors 
 
Family & 
friends 
 
VCs; corporate 
investors 
 
Resources 
acquired in 
additional 
fund raising 
Unknown yet 
(joint R&D and 
other 
cooperation 
efforts are 
expected) 
Financial capital; 
business functions; 
consultation; 
business 
opportunities; 
legitimacy 
Financial capital; 
business function 
(joint product 
development); 
legitimacy 
(product 
credibility) 
Financial 
capital 
Financial capital; 
legitimacy 
  
Notes:       Indicating the formation of the board. 
       Indicating the adjustment of the board.  
        “Shaded cell” representing resources provided by board members 
 
 
 
 
 
time 
Anthony Kuo, Ming-Sung Kao, and Nichanan Sakolvieng 
 
34 
In the following paragraphs, the 
processes of board formation and board 
adjustments, the means of boards’ 
resource provisions, and the influence of 
the board (in terms of degree and pattern) 
on internationalization are discussed.  
 
Processes of Board Formation and 
Adjustments 
 
A board of directors is more likely to be 
formed when institutional investors 
participate  
Common to all the five cases is that 
board formations were subsequent to the 
participation of institutional investors. 
When new ventures received funds from 
individual investors, formal boards of 
directors were not always formed. Only 
when institutional investors stepped in, 
boards of directors were formed. Such a 
phenomenon, we suspect, is mainly due to 
the influence of institutional pressures 
such as isomorphism - a process that 
brings organizations to greater similarities 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), rather than 
that of separation of ownership and 
control (Berle & Means, 1932). 
Separation of ownership and control 
holds, no matter whether funds come from 
an individual or institutional investor. If 
separation of ownership and control is the 
main reason for board formation, both 
individual investors and institutional 
investors, should equally demand to form 
the board. Virtually all institutional 
investors have formal boards in the firms 
in which they have invested; they may 
actually provide the impetus that pushes a 
reticent CEO to adopt more professional 
management practices such as the 
formation of an externally accountable 
board of directors. Formation of the board 
signals a new venture’s transition to 
professional management.  
 
Formation of the board as an exchange of 
partial ownership for critical external 
resources 
While attributing the higher 
likelihood of board formation to the 
participation of institutional investors, we 
do not deny the importance of separation 
of ownership and control in new ventures. 
Formation of the board does signify 
separation of ownership, but we deem it 
more a consequence, than a cause of 
board formation. Our observations lead to 
the perspective that formation of the 
board represents an exchange of partial 
ownership for critical external resources. 
If a new venture does not need any 
external resources, it will not be necessary 
to seek help from outside financiers and to 
form a formal board of directors. But this 
is usually not the case. Organizations, 
especially new ventures, depend on 
external resources to a greater or lesser 
extent, in order to survive and grow.  
With respect to the case studies, 
Company A, Company C, and Company 
D did not have sufficient financial capital 
to begin initial operations, so funds were 
raised from outside and boards were 
formed in exchange of financial capital. 
Company B raised their initial funds from 
family and friends, while Company E 
self-financed to commence business, both 
without formal boards being formed 
simultaneously. Operations could have 
been maintained without a board if self-
funding could be sustained indefinitely, 
but the later need for external resources 
eventually led to the formation of a board. 
Company B intended to expand to the 
Japanese market while Company E 
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needed external funding to relieve the 
founders’ personal financial burdens. 
Hence, they sought external financiers to 
invest, but inevitably traded off portions 
of ownership, in order to access and 
acquire critical resources from external 
sources. Company E’s founder and CTO, 
Mr. L, said:  
“I knew the company will no 
longer be ours once I have them 
[representatives from VCs and 
corporate investors] on the 
board. But our financial 
burdens were too heavy. We had 
loans to pay. We had to find 
money from outside to relieve 
our burdens.” 
 
Founders from other companies also 
expressed similar thoughts and concerns 
of loss of ownership. For example, 
Company D’s founder and CEO, Mr. H, 
remarked:  
“The company has never been 
ours [the founders] since day 
one. We’re running the 
company for directors.” 
 
Adjustments of the board: “planned” vs. 
“required”  
Adjustments of the board also reflect 
the resource dependencies of the new 
venture. When resource needs evolve as a 
new venture grows, founders endeavor to 
adjust the board in order to acquire further 
resources from external sources. 
Company A and Company C plan to 
adjust their boards, aiming for more 
strategic alliances with business partners 
to develop or market new products. 
Although they are still in the processes of 
board adjustments, new resources are 
already expected to be introduced by new 
board members. In contrast, Company D 
exhibited a different fashion of board 
adjustment. Some faithless financiers 
drew back their investments and left the 
board. Financial capital was thus reduced 
as the board size shrank. Thus, from the 
new venture’s point of view, board 
adjustments were categorized into two 
types: “planned or intended” and 
“required or demanded”. Planned and 
intended board adjustments originate 
from the new venture’s needs for 
additional external resources, and 
increase the resource endowments of the 
new venture, while required or demanded 
board adjustments are initiated by 
dissatisfied board members, and reduced 
resource endowments of the firm.  
 
Means of Resource Provisions 
 
Board members exploited various 
means to provide resources to the new 
ventures. Some resources are personally 
endowed (attached to individuals), while 
some are organizationally endowed 
(associated with firms). Board members 
exploited their individual assets, 
experience, reputation, and personal 
networks to provide personally endowed 
resources to a new venture, and leveraged 
their firms’ assets, reputation, and 
business networks to contribute 
organizationally endowed resources. For 
instance, a new venture’s legitimacy may 
result from individual endorsement 
brought about by a board member’s 
outstanding reputation, or from 
organizational endorsement made 
possible by the reputation of an 
institutional investor. A summarized 
matrix is shown in Table 4.   
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Table 4. Types of board members and sources of resource provisions. 
 
 (1) Founders (2) Family & 
friends 
(3) Venture 
capitalists 
(4) Corporate 
investors 
Personally-endowed resources (individual level) 
Assets 
Founders’ 
endowments 
Financial capital Financial capital Financial capital 
Experience Consultation Consultation Consultation 
Reputation Individual 
endorsements 
Individual 
endorsements 
Individual 
endorsements 
Personal networks Customers, 
business partners, 
channels 
Customers, business 
partners, channels 
Customers, business 
partners, channels 
Organizationally-endowed resources (firm level) 
Assets 
(Not 
applicable) (Not applicable) 
Financial capital Financial capital 
Reputation Organizational 
endorsements 
Organizational 
endorsements 
Business networks Customers, business 
partners, channels 
Customers, business 
partners, channels 
Board members are categorized as (a) 
founders, (b) family and friends, (c) VCs, 
and (d) corporate investors. The former 
two types are comprised of individuals, 
while the latter two consist of 
representatives from institutional 
investors. Different types of board 
members contribute different resources to 
new ventures. In the case studies, VCs and 
corporate investors tended to provide 
more resources than individuals, as 
organizationally endowed resources were 
often unavailable from individual sources, 
such as organizational endorsements and 
introduction of business partners via 
business networks. The most prominent 
examples are the board members in 
Company A and those in Company B, 
where board members contributed 
valuable resources associated with their 
firms. The partnerships with Taiwanese 
manufactures in the case of Company A, 
and introductions to Japanese customers 
and business partners in the case of 
Company B were both enabled by the 
board members representing institutional 
investors. However, institutional 
investors may not always intend to help or 
be capable of contributing the necessary 
resources to new ventures. We will 
discuss this issue in the next section.  
 
Degree of Directors’ Involvement in 
Internationalization 
 
The analysis of data also suggested 
that the board members of several 
companies provided abundant resources 
to lead the company to internationalize 
instantly after its establishment. For 
example, the experiences of Company 
A’s Chairman contributed to the 
formation of this company’s unique 
business model, and his personal 
networks linked the company with its 
technology and manufacturing service 
providers, so that the company could go 
international instantly. In Company E, the 
resources provided by the board members 
also enabled the company to 
internationalize to some extent. However, 
what is more crucial to the company, is 
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when one of the board members provides 
the introduction of a more resourceful 
new board member, who further initiates 
strategic change and guides the company 
to deeper internationalization.  
 
Pattern of Directors’ Involvement in 
Internationalization: Direct vs. 
Indirect 
 
While comparing the processes 
regarding how the board of directors 
provided crucial resources for the firm’s 
internationalization, different patterns of 
director involvement were found in the 
internationalization process. Company 
B’s inside directors, directly participated 
in internationalization activities, while 
Company E’s Tech’s outside directors 
contributed to the firm’s internationaliza-
tion via strategic change. That is, 
Company E’s outside directors first 
initiated the strategic change, which 
consequently led to new activities in the 
foreign country.  
 
5. IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
SUGGESTIONS  
 
The exploratory cases allowed for the 
examination of the processes of board 
formation and board adjustments in new 
ventures. How boards are formed and 
consequently adjusted in new ventures, 
what types of resources are provided by 
board members, how board members 
provided these resources, and what 
factors influence the processes were 
explored. We elaborated on several 
findings. First, board formations do not 
always coincide with financing activities. 
When a new venture raises funds from 
outside, a formal board of directors may 
not necessarily be founded concurrently. 
Second, a board of directors is more likely 
to be formed when the fund is raised from 
institutional investors. The reason mainly 
originates from the institutional pressure 
to demand that the founders adopt a more 
professional management practice. 
Formation of the board signals a new 
venture’s transition to professional 
management.  Third, formation of the 
board connotes an exchange of partial 
ownership for critical external resources. 
Founders trade off portions of their 
ownership to acquire critical resources 
only available externally. Fourth, we 
categorized adjustments of the board into 
two types: “planned and intended board 
adjustments” are initiated by the founders 
to acquire external resources, while 
“required or demanded board adjustments” 
are set out by disgruntled board members, 
and the reduced resource endowments of 
the firm. Fifth, directors exploit their 
individual assets, experience, reputation, 
and personal networks to provide 
personally endowed resources to the new 
venture, and may leverage their firms’ 
assets, reputation, and business networks 
to contribute organizationally endowed 
resources. Institutional investors contri-
bute more resources than individuals as 
some of resources are only attainable 
from organizations. Seventh, our study 
found evidence that the board of directors 
facilitates the internationalization of new 
ventures.  
 
Implications for Theories of New 
Venture Survival and Growth 
 
This study contributes to the issues of 
new venture survival and growth in 
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several ways. First, current research has 
found that strategic alliances (e.g. Pisano, 
1990; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Gulati, 
1998) and founders’ personal network 
relationships (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 
1989; Larson & Starr, 1993) facilitate new 
ventures to mitigate the liability of 
newness. Our findings reveal evidence 
that new ventures also rely on board 
members to acquire external resources 
that are critical for continued survival and 
growth. Second, as firms dynamically 
progress from emergence toward early 
growth, the firm’s resource needs evolve. 
New and additional resources from 
outside are expected to support 
continuous growth. Our findings suggest 
that new ventures further adjust their 
boards, in an attempt to acquire resources 
which will sustain growth in later stages. 
Third, relying on board members to obtain 
resources has its price and risks. Founders 
must trade off portions of ownership, and 
risks of “required or demanded board 
adjustments” do exist. 
 
The Relationship of Board Members 
and Their Degree and Pattern of 
Involvement in Internationalization 
 
Researchers in the field of 
international business and 
entrepreneurship generally agree that 
different firms have different routes to 
internationalization based on differences 
in existing resources, such as market 
knowledge, the personal network of the 
entrepreneur, international contacts, 
experience transmitted from former 
occupations, relations, and education, etc. 
(Bell, 1995). Social capital theory implies 
that new ventures should pursue strategies 
focusing on the development of valuable 
networks, with external resource owners, 
in order to succeed. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) used the term “board capital” to 
combine both human capital and 
relational capital.  More recently, Chen, 
Chang, and Hsu (2017) investigated the 
effects of board capital on a firm’s 
internationalization and included board 
co-working as a positive moderator in the 
board capital-internationalization 
relationship.  In line with these prior 
studies, our findings also revealed the 
significance of board capital in 
internationalization.   
Here, we would like to highlight 
several key findings in the first two cases, 
which correspond with the current 
literature, and to raise more potential 
research questions. First, for the two cases 
in this study, the boards of directors did 
provide various resources, including 
financial capital, advice and counsel to the 
CEO mentioned in the literature, and they 
also provided the resources necessary for 
internationalization. The “board capital”, 
comprised of human capital and relational 
capital, shapes what kind of resources 
boards provide.  
Second, when perceiving a lack of 
certain resources, founders sought for 
suitable outside board members to bring 
in the resources required as suggested in 
the literature. However, when 
encountering unsuitable potential board 
members, founders would rather not 
accept them. 
Third, the degree of directors’ 
involvement in internationalization is 
contingent on a founder’s or a firm’s 
existing resources. Meanwhile, the 
outside director’s degree of involvement 
depends on their mind share in the firm. 
Outside board members can also serve on 
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the board of other companies; they 
allocate a different portion of their efforts 
on different companies.    
Fourth, in the given case studies, 
some outside board members provided 
only financial capital, not being involved 
in internationalization, or they were 
involved indirectly in internationalization 
— via strategic change. This finding leads 
us to a new research question: is it 
possible for founders to recruit outside 
directors for the purpose of instant 
internationalization?  More studies are 
suggested in this area of research. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Suggestions for Board of Directors’ 
Role in New Ventures 
 
While contributing to the research of 
new ventures, this study has limitations as 
well. We studied new ventures from a 
specific industrial origin — the computer 
and electronics industry — due to its 
importance and higher degree of 
internationalization. This allowed us to 
bring more insights, but also made it hard 
to generalize our findings to other 
industries or contexts. When applying the 
findings of this study to other contexts, we 
need to bear in mind the limitations of 
their generalizability. 
Given the critical role of the board in 
new ventures, as revealed by our study, 
we would like to call for more research in 
this area.  Some suggestions are: first, it 
will be interesting to compare the pros and 
cons of different approaches of resource 
acquisitions, including via a boards of 
directors, strategic alliances, and founders’ 
personal network relationships. A 
comparative study is recommended. 
Second, more in-depth studies on the 
board as a means of resource provision are 
advocated. It will be essential to study the 
benefits and shortcomings of relying on 
the board for critical external resources.  
For example, how should founders 
balance the gains and the losses? How can 
the founder prevent losing power after 
outside directors join the board? We 
believe the above research topics will 
highly benefit the academic field of 
survival and growth in new ventures.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Built on the resource dependency 
theory and the board’s resource provision 
roles, five companies were selected from 
the computer and electronics industry, to 
explore board formation and adjustment 
processes in new ventures, and their 
influences on firm internationalization, 
which is expected to contribute to current 
theories and practices. Based on the 
chosen case studies, we have revealed 
diversity in the boards’ provision of 
resources.  We have also identified and 
differentiated sources of resource 
provisions. Moreover, two types of board 
adjustment processes were derived and 
categorized: “planned adjustment” and 
“required adjustment”.  Our study also 
sheds some light on the degree and the 
pattern of a board’s involvement in 
internationalization to some extent.  Thus, 
this study contributes new findings to new 
venture studies by highlighting the 
processes of board formation and 
adjustment.  Nonetheless, the exploratory 
nature and the selection of cases of the 
present study undoubtedly limits the 
insights uncovered. Further research is 
warranted to extend our understanding of 
the board’s resource provision roles in 
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different contexts.  
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